A recent decision that came from WIPO highlights some circumstances where reverse domain name hijacking (RDNH) will most likely be found. The domain name at issue was maisondumonde.com. The important facts for RDNH were primarily pointed out by the Respondent:
According to the Respondent, at the time of registration of the disputed domain name, the Complainant was unknown outside France. Only now is it known in France, Belgium, Italy and Spain where it has opened stores in the last few years. In 1996, the Complainant’s product offer was primarily gifts and accessories, but not furniture. Even today, this continues to be the majority of their product offer in their brick-and-mortar stores, and much of the Complainant’s product range still concentrates on non-furniture products.
The Respondent alleges (but does not provide evidence to show) that the Complainant only offered furniture for sale gradually after 1996 and only started developing its website in 2004. The Complainant’s furniture sales business on the web only started to take off in 2006.
The Respondent states that his product offering has not changed significantly since 2000, when he first started selling furniture in brick-and-mortar stores, and via the Internet, through the disputed domain name which was registered at the same time, together with <maisondumonde.co.uk>.
Further, says the Respondent, when the disputed domain was registered in 2000, the Complainant was a small company in France and had no more claim to use the disputed domain name than anybody else in any country other than France where it had successfully received trade name protection in its home territory.
The Respondent goes on to provide his version of the discussions between the parties that started in 2006. As stated above, the Panel will not summarize those discussions in any further detail because it considers that they are not relevant for the present case.
The Respondent states (and provides evidence to prove) that the authority that rejected his opposition to the Complainant’s CTM application found that “one of the few undisputed points in the proceedings is the fact that the presented evidence is sufficient to prove that the opponent has actually used the name Maison Du Monde in the course of trade”, in particular in the UK, primarily in the London area. (emphasis added)
The Panel found that the Respondent did have some rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, from which it had been operating its business selling furniture since 2000, and also found that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Respondent in registering the domain name.
In the present case, the Complainant knew that the Respondent was offering furniture for sale in 2000 when the Respondent first registered the disputed domain name, and the Complainant did not present any evidence showing that that business was not bona fide back in 2000. Further, the Complainant did not rebut, in its unsolicited rebuttal, the Respondent’s allegation to the effect that his activities were perfectly legitimate back in 2000. After having received the Response, the Complainant should have known that its case was insupportable under the Policy.
While the Panel does take good note of the Complainant’s allegations concerning the situation since 2006, it has no choice but to apply the Rules and to find Reverse Domain Name Hijacking, for the reasons explained above. (emphasis added)
The part that’s a little funky is “After having received the Response…” So, the Panel is creating a duty to withdraw a complaint? Hmm. In any event, they should have been prepared to argue that the Respondent knew about their business prior to starting his business in 2000. Still, I don’t see how they could have overcome the Respondent’s argument that their respective goods/services were not similar at that time (and thus it would not have been a trademark issue back then).
The Panel does wish to note, in addition, that the Response and the Respondent’s unsolicited submission were unnecessarily lengthy because they included certain allegations (not summarized above) and hundreds of pages of exhibits that were not relevant for the present case.
Looks like the Panel wasn’t very pleased with the amount of reading material it was subjected to. There are page limits, but they seem to be routinely ignored. Something to keep in mind: don’t annoy your panel! Although in this case it doesn’t seem to have affected the outcome.
The UDRP was enacted to protect trademark/brand owners from cybersquatters, people who were unfairly using domain names that belonged to their products/services/companies. The UDRP has been invoked successfully to protect personal names, typically where the complainant is a famous celebrity, but several recent complaints have failed because they did not specifically allege, or were unable to show, trademark rights in the names at issue.
A little brief elaboration: a name can be used as a mark, of course. But you have to show that it has been used as a mark. This could be as simple as putting your name on a line of t-shirts, or paper products, or business cards for your maid service. The point is that you must show a connection between the name and the goods or services offered. And, as with unregistered marks, the old problems of sufficiency of the evidence must be overcome.
In one of the cases published this morning, Wernher Pramschufer’s complaint about wernherpramschufer.net failed because he did not show how his name was being used as a mark. The panelist denied the complaint “without prejudice” though, probably believing that Mr. Pramschufer could ultimately show the required evidence but for some reason was unable to do so within the time frame for the UDRP action.
And the trio of Proskauer cases from WIPO earlier this month, the greggmashberg.com, josephleccese.com, and allenfagin.com denials, several partners at the prominent law firm were unable to obtain transfer of domain names being used as gripe sites about them personally, in part because they were unable to show that they had any trademark rights in their names as such, apart from their employment by the prominent Proskauer firm (which was able to show rights in the PROSKAUER mark, but still failed to obtain transfer of proskauerlawfirm.com because of its use as a gripe site).
Contrast this with cases where transfers were ordered, like juliaroberts.com, tommylee.com, and tomcruise.com. In those cases, the individuals were able to show actual rights in their names as marks, typically through the long and public use of their names in connection with their services (acting, music, whatever). But the point remains, under the UDRP a name without something more — some solid evidence of use of the name as a mark — will not satisfy the first prong of the UDRP.
Here’s yet more evidence that establishing rights to common law marks is not easy. In this recent denial from NAF, the Complainant sought to obtain the transfer of some domain names — liverpoollumber.com and joeehle.com — which were being used for complaints about the company and its founder/CEO. (Apparently the business thought they could silence the gripe site because it was confusingly similar; they may have a case under the ACPA, but certainly not under the UDRP on that point alone, as there are three prongs that must be made out.)
In support of its complaint, the Complainant provided an affidavit of the founder Joe Ehle, which detailed the use of the LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO INC and JOE EHLE marks over several decades. Neither mark appears to have been registered.
As I recently showed, the bar is high for common law marks, and a single affidavit is probably never going to be sufficient (unless the unregistered mark is so immediately recognizable that a Panel can’t conclude otherwise; I can’t imagine that ever being the case, as if it was that recognizable, you’d expect it to be registered at some point). That’s exactly how the Panel held here:
Complainant alleges that both marks have been used in conjunction with the lumber products business it runs and in conjunction with one another, the LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO INC mark since the 1940s and the JOE EHLE mark for the last 20 years. Complainant provides an affidavit where Mr. Joseph Ehle testified to the effect that the lumber company has been in his family since its opening in the 1940s. Complainants have also provided corporate registration documents from New York state including the date of formation. Except for the affidavit of Mr. Joseph Ehle, no other evidences was submiited to support the common law rights in either LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO INC or JOE EHLE marks.Common law rights arise from actual use of a mark in connection with certain services and/or products. In addition, to successfully assert common law or unregistered trademark rights, a Complainant must show that its alleged mark has become a distinctive identifier associated with the complainant or its goods and services.
. . .
In connection to LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO INC, the Complainant asserts that it acquired common law rights for services of sale distribution and installation of windows, doors, cabinetry, interior and exterior fabrications and other lumber related products and related design services. The evidence brought by the Complainant to support this assertion refers to the date of creation of the business back in 1940s, the advertisement and the sales under the alleged mark level of $8 million per year. All this data results, mainly, from Joe Ehle’s affidavit. Except for the registration information of the company LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC and two ads by which the services of the company LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC with its contact data are presented, none of the evidence brought, refers to the use of mark LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC in connection to certain services, but to the name of the company LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC selling these services. Moreover, after performing its own search on internet, the Panel found that no reference is made to LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC as a mark for certain services but to LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC as a company name with contact data delivering such services. It is also, the opinion of the Panel, that the Complainant failed to show that its alleged LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC mark has become a distinctive identifier associated with the Complainant or its goods and services.
. . .
Joe Ehle is the CEO and President of the company LIVERPOOL LUMBER CO., INC. The Complainant asserts common law trademark rights in JOE EHLE for the same services provided by the company, because he has been associated with the business for more than thirty years. The only evidence provided in support to this statement is Joe Ehle’s affidavit and an article in some “Business publication” , which mentions Ehle as the President and Owner of the company LIVERPOOLLUMBER CO.,INC. No mention whatsoever is made in connection to offering the company services under JOE EHLE trademark.
JOE EHLE’s name does not appear on the Complainants’ marketing material or building.
The Panel finds that the Complainant has failed to establish its rights in the JOE EHLE mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). . . . (emphasis added)
This is an important distinction. A company/business name, or a personal name, is not necessarily a trademark or service mark! A Complainant has to show an actual use of the mark in connection with a service or products. So, either you’re doing something and advertising your doing of that something under this name — Johnny’s Expert Dog-washing Services, Inc. — or you’re putting your mark on a widget that you’re selling to a consumer. Here, apparently the Complainant wasn’t doing either, merely listing the company name on advertisements which sold the products that it was in the business of selling. In any event, the Panel did not find the evidence submitted particularly persuasive.
I think it’s quite easy to say that Respondents are in a much better position in cases under the UDRP that invoke common law rights in a mark, because it’s always easier to poke holes in what the other side is arguing. And from a Complainant’s perspective, if unregistered rights are all that you have, you should absolutely bury the Panel with evidence of your rights, because a Respondent’s job of calling that evidence into doubt is so much easier.
The Panel didn’t even reach the rights or legitimate interests of the Respondent in this decision, though I think they would have had a strong argument to make that the sites were being used for legitimate gripe sites about the Complainant’s business. (I checked and there doesn’t appear to be any commercial gain from those web sites at all, which is good if you’re looking to set up such a gripe site!)
Domain Name: glasgowsigns.com
Element(s) Not Met: 4(a)(i)
Case: Glasgow Signs v. 1st Signs Limited trading as Sign-A-Rama, No. D2010-0409 (WIPO May 4, 2010)
Complainant and Respondent are both in the commercial signage business around Glasgow, Scotland. Respondent began using the Domain Name for its business in March 2006. The parties disputed when Complainant began using the term GLASGOW SIGNS.
That dispute as to facts, however, was immaterial to the Panel’s decision in the overall domain name dispute.
The Panel noted that under paragraph 4(a)(i) of the UDRP, a complainant may demonstrate rights in a mark which are not registered. But a person can only obtain rights in descriptive terms when it is shown through evidence that the term has become distinctive by acquiring a secondary meaning. Even very extensive use may not be enough to bring a highly descriptive term into the realm of protectibility.
In this case, the Panel found that Complaint failed because Complainant had put forward none of the following:
- specific evidence as to the extent of its use of the descriptive term
- a statement as to the value of sales made under the term
- a statement of expenditures made on advertising or promotion of the term
- disclosure of the nature of any advertising or promotin
- evidence showing customers or suppliers had come to perceive the term as a brand
For these reasons, the Panel found that Complainant “fail[ed] at first base,” so there was no need to consider any of the remaining arguments under the UDRP.
Photo courtesy Flickr user rightee under this Creative Commons license.
